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ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND COLLEGE
ADMISSIONS POLICIES
David Orentlicher*
As economic inequality in the United States has reached unprece-
dented heights, reformers have focused considerable attention on
changes in the law that would provide for greater equality in wealth
among Americans. No doubt, much benefit would result from more equi-
table tax policies, fairer workplace regulation, and more generous
spending policies.
But there may be even more to gain by revising college admissions
policies. Admissions policies at the Ivy League and other elite American
colleges do much to exacerbate the problem of economic inequality. Ac-
cordingly, reforming those policies may represent the most effective
strategy for restoring a reasonable degree of economic equality in the
United States.
Fortunately, there is an important alternative to traditional admis-
sions policies for elite universities to consider—“top class rank” poli-
cies. Indeed, some public universities have already adopted top class
rank policies in lieu of affirmative action to promote student body diver-
sity. While the impact on student diversity is a key feature of top rank
policies, this Article focuses on another critical benefit of the policies—
their ability to turn elite universities from institutions that exacerbate
economic inequality into institutions that foster economic equality.
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INTRODUCTION
As economic inequality in the United States has reached unprece-
dented heights, reformers have focused considerable attention on
changes in the law that would provide for greater equality in wealth
among Americans. More equitable tax policies, fairer workplace regula-
tion, and more generous spending policies would do much to promote
equity.1
But there may be even more to gain by revising college admissions
policies. Admissions policies at the Ivy League2 and other elite American
colleges greatly exacerbate the problem of economic inequality. Accord-
ingly, reforming those policies may represent the most effective strategy
for restoring a reasonable degree of economic equality in the United
States.
More specifically, elite universities can do much to promote eco-
nomic equality by adopting “top class rank” admissions policies.3 In-
1 Expansion of the earned income tax credit would be quite useful, as would a higher
minimum wage and greater funding of food stamps and housing subsidies for the poor.
2 See Ivy League, DICTIONARY (July 16, 2016), http://www.dictionary.com/browse/ivy-
league?s=T.
3 Under top class rank policies, colleges base their admissions decisions primarily—or
even exclusively—on a student’s high school class rank. As discussed later in this article, top
class rank policies take different forms. See infra note 25. The focus of this article is on the
Texas model under which students earn automatic admission to a public college if their grade
point average (GPA) places them in the top part of their high school class rank. For more
detail, see infra text accompanying note 25.
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deed, some public universities already have adopted top class rank
policies, though primarily in order to promote student body diversity.
While the impact on student diversity is a key feature of top rank poli-
cies, this article focuses on their ability to turn elite universities from
institutions that exacerbate economic inequality into institutions that fos-
ter economic equality.
I. ECONOMIC INEQUALITY COMPROMISES ECONOMIC MOBILITY IN THE
UNITED STATES
In recent decades, economic inequality in the United States has
greatly increased. In 2007, the top ten percent of families took home a
fifty percent share of national income, the first time that has happened
(according to data going back to 1910).4 The rich have been getting
richer and the poor are increasingly being left behind.
The problem of economic inequality is worsened by stratified resi-
dential geography. The well-to-do are less likely than in the past to live
next door to the indigent, leaving many of the poor in neighborhoods that
are socially isolated from their more prosperous counterparts.5 As a re-
sult, many children live in “high-disadvantage” communities that suffer
from high rates of poverty, low-performing schools, high levels of unem-
ployment and crime, and increased environmental risks to health.6 These
community detriments have lifelong implications, especially for black
children. A black child growing up in a high-poverty community suffers
from diminished cognitive skills,7 reduced high school graduation rates,8
and downward economic mobility.9 The United States is no longer the
land of opportunity that it promises to be. The odds of climbing the so-
4 See THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 24 (2014).
5 See SHERYLL CASHIN, PLACE, NOT RACE: A NEW VISION OF OPPORTUNITY IN
AMERICA 25 (2014); Paul A. Jargowsky, Architecture of Segregation: Civil Unrest, the Con-
centration of Poverty, and Public Policy, 2015 CENTURY FOUND. 1, http://apps.tcf.org/archi-
tecture-of-segregation; Patrick Sharkey & Bryan Graham, Mobility and the Metropolis: How
Communities Factor into Economic Mobility, 2013 PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS 7, http://
www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2013/MobilityandtheMetropo
lispdf.
6 See Geoffrey T. Wodtke, David J. Harding & Felix Elwert, Neighborhood Effects in
Temporal Perspective: The Impact of Long-Term Exposure to Concentrated Disadvantage on
High School Graduation, 76 AM. SOC. REV. 713, 715–16 (2011).
7 See Robert J. Sampson, Patrick Sharkey & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Durable Effects
of Concentrated Disadvantage on Verbal Ability Among African-American Children, 105
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 845, 845 (2008).
8 See Wodtke et al., supra note 6, at 729.
9 See Patrick Sharkey, Neighborhoods and the Black-White Mobility Gap, 2009 PEW
CHARITABLE TRUSTS 2–3, http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/
2009/pewneighborhoods1pdf; CASHIN, supra note 5, at 24; see also Richard Rothstein, Racial
Segregation and Black Student Achievement, EDUC., JUST., & DEMOCRACY 173, 173 (Danielle
Allen & Rob Reich eds. 2013).
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cioeconomic ladder are low for those on the bottom rungs, and well be-
low the odds they would face in other Western developed countries.10
In short, while being poor presents serious obstacles to a child’s
future, growing up in a poor community presents even more serious ob-
stacles to success. Research has shown that “the more economically seg-
regated a metro area is, the less economically mobile its residents are”11
and that what matters more for economic mobility is not the degree of
economic inequality but the degree to which neighborhoods are econom-
ically segregated.12 Thus, for example, studies have shown that the eco-
nomic mobility of poor children improves when their families move from
a high-poverty neighborhood to a more advantaged community.13
II. TRADITIONAL COLLEGE ADMISSIONS POLICIES EXACERBATE
ECONOMIC INEQUALITY
Upper-income families have many reasons to carve out exclusive
residential enclaves, independent of college admissions policies. The
well-to-do can create communities with low crime rates, low poverty
rates, and excellent schools. Nevertheless, college admissions policies
play an important role as well. These policies have done much to reward,
and therefore accelerate, residential segregation by income in America.14
Currently, when thinking about their children’s prospects for admis-
sion to college, upper-income parents recognize that they are better off
with a two-tiered educational system in which their children attend a
small number of high-performing schools that the Ivy League and other
elite universities rely upon as “feeder” schools.15 The parents’ children
10 Economic mobility is 2.5 times higher in Canada and more than three times higher in
Denmark than in the United States. See John E. Morton & Isabel V. Sawhill, Economic Mobil-
ity: Is the American Dream Alive and Well?, 2007 PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS 5, http://
www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/reports/2007/05/25/is-the-american-dream-alive-
and-well.
11 See Sharkey & Graham, supra note 5, at 9.
12 See id. at 10.
13 See Raj Chetty & Nathaniel Hendren, The Impacts of Neighborhoods on Intergenera-
tional Mobility: Childhood Exposure Effects and County-Level Estimates 4 (Harv. U. Dep’t of
Econ., 2015), http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/hendren/files/nbhds_paper.pdf; see also Heather
Schwartz, Housing Policy Is School Policy: Economically Integrative Housing Promotes Aca-
demic Success in Montgomery County, Maryland, 2010 CENTURY FOUND. 5, http://
www.tcf.org/assets/downloads/tcf-Schwartz.pdf.
14 See Chetty & Hendren, supra note 13, at 4.
15 At the University of Texas at Austin, for example, half of the 1996 entering class came
from only about four percent of high schools in Texas (59 out of more than 1,500 statewide).
Mark C. Long et al., Policy Transparency and College Enrollment: Did the Texas Top Ten
Percent Law Broaden Access to the Public Flagships?, 627 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
SCI. 82, 84–85 (2010). At Harvard, one-third of the 2013 entering class came from eleven
percent of the high schools that sent students to the class. Meg P. Bernhard, The Making of a
Harvard Feeder School, HARV. CRIMSON, Dec. 13, 2013, http://www.thecrimson.com/article/
2013/12/13/making-harvard-feeder-schools.
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will be better prepared for the SAT or ACT exams, and selective col-
leges16 will dip deeper into the schools’ senior classes in making offers
of acceptance.17 Parents with means therefore prefer a residential geogra-
phy with a relatively small number of higher-income communities that
have higher-performing school districts.
In these higher-income communities, the parents wield their politi-
cal influence and wealth on behalf of their children. They lobby for in-
creases in public funding for their school districts, and they also generate
greater private funding by creating foundations that supplement their
school districts’ government dollars.18 In addition, they provide their
children with the other advantages of prosperous communities.
Reserving their influence and wealth for their own children has paid
ample dividends for the well-to-do. At the 193 most selective colleges
and universities in the United States, students from the richest quartile of
the population outnumber students from the poorest quartile by a ratio of
fourteen to one.19 And there are many benefits to students who attend an
elite university. Their institutions spend much more on them than would
lower-ranked schools,20 they are more likely to earn a bachelor’s degree
and gain acceptance to graduate or professional school,21 and they enjoy
higher lifetime earnings.22 Students at elite universities also are more
16 “Selective” colleges are those that are selective in their admissions decisions, admit-
ting a limited percentage of applicants based on the quality of the applicants’ credentials.
17 See Long et al., supra note 15, at 84–85.
18 See, e.g., CARMEL HIGH SCHOOL FOUNDATION, http://www.carmelhighschoolfounda
tion.org/.
19 See Peter Dreier & Richard D. Kahlenberg, Making Top Colleges Less Aristocratic
and More Meritocratic, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/13/up
shot/making-top-colleges-less-aristocratic-and-more-meritocratic.html.
20 See The Hechinger Report, Education Spending Gap Widens Between College Haves
and Have-Nots, U.S. NEWS (Jan. 25, 2016, 2:18 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/
2016-01-25/education-spending-gap-widens-between-college-haves-and-have-nots-since-
recession.
21 See Anthony P. Carnevale & Jeff Strohl, Separate & Unequal: How Higher Education
Reinforces the Intergenerational Reproduction of White Racial Privilege, 2013 CTR. ON EDUC.
& THE WORKFORCE 24–25, https://cew.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/
SeparateUnequal.FR_.pdf. In 2007, highly selective colleges spent $92,000 per student while
low-selectivity colleges spent only $12,000 per student. Caroline M. Hoxby, The Changing
Selectivity of American Colleges, 23(4) J. ECON. PERSP. 95, 109 (2009).
22 See Caroline M. Hoxby, The Return to Attending a More Selective College: 1960 to
the Present, FORUM FUTURES: EXPLORING THE FUTURE OF HIGHER EDUC., 2000 PAPERS 24
(Maureen Devlin & Joel Meyerson eds., 2001). According to one estimate, attending a state
flagship university can yield an increase of around twenty percent in annual earnings by ages
28–32. See Mark Hoekstra, The Effect of Attending the Flagship State University on Earnings:
A Discontinuity-Based Approach, 91 REV. ECON. & STAT. 717, 724 (2009). Some researchers
have not found an earnings premium for the typical student from attendance at an elite univer-
sity. Stacy B. Dale & Alan B. Krueger, Estimating the Effects of Characteristics over the
Career Using Administrative Earning Data, 49 J. HUM. RESOURCES 323, 325–26 (2014). But
even under their analysis, students from disadvantaged backgrounds realize a substantial earn-
ings premium from attending a selective college. See id. at 326. In other words, when students
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likely to form friendships and develop other ties with classmates who
will become leaders in government, business, and the professions.23
In short, by leveraging their wealth to create exclusive and ad-
vantaged communities, well-to-do parents are better able to secure seats
in the elite universities for their children and ensure an intergenerational
reproduction of privilege.24
As indicated, college admissions policies are not the only factor in-
fluencing economic inequality. But the policies play an important role.
Moreover, reform of college admissions policies can provide a counter-
balance to economic inequality from all causes. That is the topic of the
next section of this article.
III. TOP CLASS RANK POLICIES PROMOTE ECONOMIC EQUALITY
Instead of employing the traditional admissions policies that foster
economic inequality, America’s elite universities could follow the Texas
approach to college admissions at the state’s public universities. Rather
than basing admissions on an applicant’s grades, test scores, essays, and
other factors, the universities would base admission primarily on an ap-
plicant’s high school class rank. Under the simple version of the Texas
top class rank policy, students are guaranteed admission to the University
of Texas at Austin (UT-Austin), Texas A&M University, and other state
colleges if their grade point average (“GPA”) places them in the top ten
percent of their high school class.25
Texas adopted its top class rank policy in the wake of Hopwood v.
University of Texas, a 1996 decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit.26 The Hopwood court concluded that the Fourteenth
from lower-income families are excluded from elite universities, they lose an important oppor-
tunity to ascend the socioeconomic ladder.
23 The U.S. president, every justice on the U.S. Supreme Court, and around half of U.S.
senators have earned an undergraduate, graduate, or professional degree at a top university.
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 332 (2003).
24 See Carnevale & Strohl, supra note 21, at 7.
25 As top ten students accounted for an increasing percentage of the UT-Austin entering
class, the campus sought and obtained a revision of the top ten law. See infra, note 45. Since
2011, UT-Austin reserves only seventy-five percent of its entering slots for the automatically
admitted students and therefore adjusts its top class rank cut-off annually, usually ending up at
the top seven or eight percent of high school classes. Other states also have top class rank
policies, but typically guarantee admission to one of the state’s public universities rather than
to all of them (e.g., Florida), or treat a top class rank as a strong preference rather than a
guarantee of admission (e.g., California). See Talented Twenty Program, FLA. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
http://www.fldoe.org/schools/family-community/activities-programs/talented-twenty-program;
Statewide Path, U. OF CAL., http://admission.universityofcalifornia.edu/freshman/california-re
sidents/admissions-index/index.html. There also is precedent from France. In July 2013, the
French Parliament enacted a top class rank policy for the country in order to ensure equal
access to higher education for immigrant, low-income, and rural students.
26 See Hopwood v. Univ. of Tex., 78 F.3d 592 (5th Cir. 1996).
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Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause forbids public universities from
taking race or ethnicity into account in their admissions decisions. As a
result, state universities in Texas could not employ traditional affirmative
action policies as a way to promote the racial and ethnic diversity of their
student bodies (until the U.S. Supreme Court validated affirmative action
in 2003).27 The Texas legislature responded to Hopwood by enacting the
state’s top class rank policy.28 Because many high schools have an over-
whelmingly minority student body,29 admitting the top ten percent of
every high school provides a useful way to bring diversity to a college’s
entering class.
Indeed, at UT-Austin, the top class rank policy has done much more
than has the university’s affirmative action policy to promote admission
of underrepresented racial and ethnic minorities and the economically
disadvantaged. As mentioned earlier,30 top class rank students account
for 75% of the UT entering class, with the other 25% being assessed on a
range of factors, including grades, standardized test scores, essays, rec-
ommendations, extracurricular activities, community service, socioeco-
nomic background, race, and ethnicity.31 In 2015, the top class rank part
of the class was 36% white, 6% black, and 28% Hispanic.32 The other
part of the class, with its affirmative action component, included 49%
white, 4% black, and 14% Hispanic students.33 With regard to economic
27 In Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), the Supreme Court overruled Hopwood.
28 David Orentlicher, Affirmative Action and Texas’ Ten Percent Solution: Improving
Diversity and Quality, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 181, 187 (1998). For more discussion of the
Texas policy, see LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, MINER’S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, RE-
SISTING POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 67–74 (2002).
29 In the Houston Independent School District, 87% of students are African-American or
Hispanic. 2015–2016 Facts and Figures, HOUSTON INDEP. SCH. DISTRICT, http://www.houston
isd.org/site/default.aspx?PageType=14&DomainID=7908&PageID=41879&ModuleInstance
ID=48525&ViewID=1e008a8a-8e8a-4ca0-9472-a8f4a723a4a7&IsMoreExpandedView=true
(last visited June 20, 2016). In the Dallas Independent School District, 93% of students are
African-American or Hispanic. 2015.2016 Facts, DALLAS INDEP. SCH. DISTRICT, http://
www.dallasisd.org/cms/lib/TX01001475/Centricity/Domain/48/district_facts.pdf (last visited
June 20, 2016). In the San Antonio Independent School District, 97.5% of students are Afri-
can-American or Hispanic. SAISD at a Glance, SAN ANTONIO INDEP. SCH. DISTRICT, http://
www.saisd.net/main/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=1676&tmpl=com
ponent&format=raw&Itemid=160 (last visited June 20, 2016).
30 See supra note 25; see also infra note 45.
31 Fisher, 136 S. Ct. at 2205–06.
32 The University of Texas at Austin, Report to the Governor, the Lieutenant Governor,
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives on the Implementation of SB 175, 81st Legis-
lature: For the Period Ending Fall 2015, at 33 (Dec. 31, 2015), http://admissions.utexas.edu/
docs/sb175_report_2015.pdf.
33 Id. Among high school seniors in Texas, 32% are white, 12.5% are black, and 49% are
Hispanic. TEX. EDUC. AGENCY, generated by David Orentlicher, using PEIMS Standard Re-
ports Overview (2016).
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background, 19% of the top class rank students came from families with
an income less than $40,000. Only 7% of the other students did.34
While the diversity benefits of top class rank policies are important,
they are not the point of this article. Rather, I am interested here in what
top class rank policies offer beyond promoting student body diversity. As
economic theory predicts, and empirical evidence from Texas shows, top
rank policies can play a critical role in promoting the economic integra-
tion of America’s neighborhoods and thereby in fostering a greater de-
gree of economic equality in the United States.
A. Top Class Rank Policies Provide Incentives for Economic
Equality
Consider what would happen if top class rank policies were imple-
mented widely by the elite universities in the United States, private as
well as public. That is, leading universities would only admit students
who placed in the top five or ten percent of their high school class rank.35
With universal use of top class rank policies, students attending high-
performing high schools would lose their advantage in the admissions
process. Finishing in the top rank of a lower-performing school would be
preferable to finishing just below the top rank at a strong school. In a
world of top class rank policies, the odds of gaining admission to Yale,
the University of Chicago, or Stanford would be much greater from an
urban high school than from a suburban or private high school.36 The
incentive for parents to congregate in a small number of high-performing
school districts would drop substantially. And that incentive would be
replaced by a strong incentive to disperse over a large number of school
districts.37
As higher-income families moved to lower-performing school dis-
tricts,38 they would do much to improve the districts’ schools. Impor-
tantly, lower-performing schools would gain backing from a stronger
constituency. The higher-income families would continue to lobby for
increases in public school funding and to support greater private funding
34 Report to the Governor, supra note 32, at 34.
35 Because they draw from a national applicant pool and are more selective than UT-
Austin and other top public universities, elite private universities might need a higher threshold
than the Texas top ten percent for a top class rank policy. For further discussion, see infra text
accompanying notes 51–52, 55.
36 While urban communities often suffer from higher rates of poverty than do suburban
communities, there are many distressed suburban and rural communities, too. CASHIN, supra
note 5, at 25–26. Top class rank policies would help distressed suburban and rural communi- R
ties as well.
37 Orentlicher, supra note 28, at 190.
38 As discussed, infra, text accompanying notes 50–51, this argument does not assume
that higher-income families would choose low-performing school districts. Rather, the assump-
tion is that they would settle on schools with not as high a level of achievement.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\26-1\CJP103.txt unknown Seq: 9 30-NOV-16 10:36
2016] ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 109
through school district foundations,39 but they would do so for the lower-
performing school districts. Moreover, the benefits would extend to K-8
education, partly because funding is allocated on a district-wide basis,
and also because many families will not wait until high school to choose
their school districts or because families will enroll their younger chil-
dren in K-8 grades when they enroll their older children in high schools.
In addition to improving lower-performing schools, the inflow of
higher-income families would create other important benefits for disad-
vantaged communities. Rates of poverty, unemployment, and crime
would fall, and revenues would rise from property taxes and other local
levies. Consequently, local government agencies would enjoy a fortunate
combination of greater resources for public services and a reduced de-
mand for those services. Stop-gap safety net spending could be replaced
by long-term investments in public transportation, other critical infra-
structure, and important cultural institutions. Indeed, top class rank poli-
cies could do much to correct the imbalances in public finances from
community to community that exacerbate socioeconomic disparities in
the United States.
Most importantly, by creating a greater degree of residential integra-
tion by income, top class rank policies would give children in all com-
munities a meaningful opportunity to move up the socioeconomic ladder.
Top class rank policies directly address the obstacles to economic equal-
ity in the United States from stratified residential geography.
B. Empirical Evidence from Texas Illustrates the Benefits of Top
Class Rank Policies
Of course, an important question is whether parents really would
choose less competitive, lower-performing high schools to guarantee a
top high school class rank for their children. College prospects are a
leading consideration for families when choosing a high school,40 but
they are not the only reason why parents prefer higher-performing
schools for their children and wealthier school districts for their resi-
dences. Moreover, a lower-performing school may not provide as strong
a preparation for the rigors of college study.
On this question, we have important empirical evidence from the
implementation of the Texas top class rank policy. The studies indicate
that top class rank policies do in fact cause families to select lower-per-
forming schools and school districts. A leading study found that among
39 See supra text accompanying note 18.
40 MARK SCHNEIDER, PAUL TESKE & MELISSA MARSCHALL, CHOOSING SCHOOLS: CON-
SUMER CHOICE AND THE QUALITY OF AMERICAN SCHOOLS 91 (2000) (describing survey data
with 69% of parents listing college matriculation rate as a reason for their children’s schools’
high quality).
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students with both an interest in attending a flagship public university in
Texas and an opportunity to strategically enroll in a different high
school, families for at least five percent of students made the strategic
choice.41
Not only do families choose lower-performing schools, they also
choose to live in lower-performing school districts. A study on this ques-
tion found that after adoption of the Texas top class rank policy, in-
creases in property values were significantly higher in lower-performing
than in higher-performing school districts, especially in the lowest-per-
forming districts.42 And the increases in property taxes were quite mean-
ingful, measuring in the millions of dollars per district (though still in the
range of about eight percent of total property tax revenues).43
To be sure, the impact has been modest, but one would not expect a
huge impact from the Texas top class rank policy. While students’
chances for admission to the state’s public universities are higher if they
apply from a lower-performing high school, their chances for admission
to selective private universities or out-of-state public universities remain
greater from higher-performing high schools. For students who want to
attend Princeton, Rice, or the University of Michigan, the Texas top class
rank policy does not change the students’ incentives for choice of high
school.44
In addition, while Texas guarantees admission to top class rank stu-
dents, a top class rank is not the exclusive path to a public university in
the State. For financial, family, or other reasons, many top class rank
students do not exercise their option to enroll, leaving many seats for
non-top class rank applicants at even the most selective public universi-
ties.45 Hence, Texas students can pursue their interest in an excellent
41 Julie Berry Cullen, Mark C. Long & Randall Reback, Jockeying for Position: Strate-
gic High School Choice Under Texas’ Top Ten Percent Plan, 97 J. PUB. ECON. 32, 44 (2013).
The study also found that more students would have transferred if there had been nearby high
schools that offered a sufficient increase in chances of finishing in the top ten percent of the
class. Id. at 44.
42 Kalena E. Cortes & Andrew I. Friedson, Ranking Up by Moving Out: The Effect of the
Texas Top 10% Plan on Property Values, 67 NAT’L TAX J. 51, 66–68 (2014).
43 Id. at 74.
44 Even without a top class rank policy, some high achievers might prefer a less competi-
tive school. They might want to increase their chances of standing out. But switching to a top
class rank policy for in-state public universities does not give those high achievers a greater
reason to choose the less competitive school if they hope to study at a private or out-of-state
public university.
45 In the early years of the Texas top class rank policy, about half of the UT-Austin first-
year class comprised top class rank admittees. Sunny X. Niu & Marta Tienda, Minority Stu-
dent Academic Performance Under the Uniform Admission Law: Evidence from the University
of Texas at Austin, 32 EDUC. EVAL. & POL’Y ANALYSIS 44, 49 (2010). Top class rank admit-
tees constituted an increasing percentage of entering classes, peaking at 87% with the 2010
first-year class. To preserve admission prospects for non-top ten students, the state legislature
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state university without moving to a lower-performing school. At St.
John’s School, an elite private high school in Houston, more than forty
percent of the senior class was admitted to UT-Austin in 2014.46 Given
the limits of the incentive, it is impressive that the Texas policy has had
as big an effect as it has.
C. Nationwide Implementation Would Increase the Impact of Top
Class Rank Policies
Although top class rank policies can have only a modest impact
when limited to public universities in a state, the policies could easily
have a substantial impact if used widely by public and private universi-
ties. If all selective universities, whether in Texas or in other states,
adopted a top class rank model, the incentives for choosing a lower-per-
forming school would become very strong.
As discussed above, the benefits from attending an elite university
are considerable.47 Accordingly, competition for admission to selective
universities is fierce. At Harvard, 39,041 students applied for the class of
2020, and only 2,106—less than six percent—were accepted.48 Stanford
attracted even more applications, 43,997, and accepted only 2,063—less
than five percent of candidates.49 Parents spend thousands of dollars on
tutors and SAT prep courses, tens of thousands of dollars on tuition at
top-notch private schools, and students look for every opportunity to bur-
nish their resumes. The whole process has come to be known as the col-
lege admissions “arms race.”50 With the enormous interest in attending
elite universities and the low odds for acceptance, families will be very
attracted to options that meaningfully increase their chances of accept-
capped top class rank enrollment at 75% of the first-year class for UT-Austin, beginning with
the fall 2011 entering class. Report to the Governor, supra note 32, at 2.
46 Telephone conversation with Courtney Burger, Director of Admission, St. John’s
School, Houston, Texas. None of St. John’s School’s students qualify for the automatic admis-
sion based on class rank. Because St. John’s does not rank its students, they are not eligible for
the top class rank policy.
47 See supra text accompanying notes 19–24. And even if parents and students overesti-
mate the benefits of attending an elite college, they act on the basis of their perceptions.
Hence, many parents make every effort to improve their children’s chances of admission to
selective universities.
48 Harvard Admitted Students Profile, HARV. C., https://college.harvard.edu/admissions/
admissions-statistics (last visited Aug. 14, 2016).
49 Press Release, Stanford Univ., Stanford Offers Admission to 2,063 Students from
Around the World (Mar. 25, 2016), available at http://news.stanford.edu/2016/03/25/admit-
admission-announce-032516 (last visited Aug. 14, 2016). Even these daunting statistics over-
state most applicants’ odds of acceptance since some students are accepted at multiple elite
universities.
50 DON HOSSLER, JACOB P.K. GROSS & BRANDI M. BECK, PUTTING THE COLLEGE ADMIS-
SION “ARMS RACE” IN CONTEXT: AN ANALYSIS OF RECENT TRENDS IN COLLEGE ADMISSION
AND THEIR EFFECTS ON INSTITUTIONAL POLICIES AND PRACTICES 3 (2010), http://www.nacac
net.org/research/publicationsresources/marketplace/documents/collegeadmissionarmsrace.pdf.
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ance. And under a top class rank policy, moving to a lower-performing
school district would greatly increase the chances of acceptance for most
upper-income families.
This is not to say that families would select the weakest school dis-
trict instead of the strongest district. That might happen to some extent in
the case of a low-performing district or school with excellent programs
for gifted students. For the most part, though, one would expect more of
a cascading effect. Some families would choose a B district over an A
district, others a C district over a B district, and so on. Early responders
will make the lower-performing schools more attractive, and more fami-
lies will be interested in those schools in subsequent years. Over time,
the incentives for choosing a lower-performing school district would be-
come self-reinforcing and lead to a distribution of wealth across schools
and school districts that is much more uniform than exists today.
Note that it would be important to make a top class rank necessary
rather than just sufficient for admission to college. As the Texas experi-
ence indicates, the incentives created by top class rank policies are di-
luted if students can gain admission to selective universities without a
top class rank.
How high would an applicant’s class rank need to be if all selective
universities adopted a top class rank policy? Entering class data suggest
that a top ten percent threshold would work well overall for the leading
universities. About 1.6 million students enroll as full-time freshmen in
four-year colleges every year, and more than eight percent of those stu-
dents attend one of Barron’s 82 most selective universities or University
of California-Berkeley, University of Illinois, University of Michigan,
UT-Austin, or University of Wisconsin, which are examples of elite uni-
versities not included in Barron’s top 82.51 At the most selective schools,
a higher threshold might be needed, closer to the one or two percent
range. Indeed, Harvard could fill its entering class with about one-tenth
of a percent of the 1.6 million.52
51 Ranking Colleges by Selectivity, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2013/04/04/business/economy/economix-selectivity-table.html; KEVIN EAGAN ET
AL., THE AMERICAN FRESHMAN: NATIONAL NORMS 5 (2014). Total entering class numbers of
about 134,000 were calculated by drawing individual class numbers from each university’s
“common data set,” which usually is available on the university’s website. For an example of a
common data set, see 2015–2016 Common Data Set, WILLIAMS C. (Dec. 4, 2015), http://
provost.williams.edu/files/williams_cds_1516_w_tuition.pdf (last visited Aug. 14, 2016).
While 134,000 is less than 10% of 1.6 million, the examples of Berkeley, Michigan, Texas,
etc., indicate that Barron’s most competitive list excludes a number of elite universities.
52 1,667 students enrolled in the Harvard Class of 2020. Harvard Admitted, supra note
48. For the class of 2018, more than 3,000 high school valedictorians applied to Harvard.
College Admits Class of ‘18, HARV. GAZETTE, Mar. 27, 2014, http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/
story/2014/03/college-admits-class-of-18/. Even under a top student only policy, the college
could have accepted only about two-thirds of applicants who would have been eligible for
admission.
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But even at the most selective institutions, a more generous top
class rank could work. As discussed in the next section of this article,
highly selective schools could use a top five or ten percent rank as a
threshold requirement for admission to narrow the pool of eligible appli-
cants. Then the schools could use other criteria to choose among appli-
cants—as long as the odds for admission from the narrowed pool were
equal across different high schools. In other words, an elite college
would automatically reject any student below the top five or ten percent
and then decide among the remaining applicants based on whatever crite-
ria it wanted, as long as the odds of admission from any one high school
were similar to the odds of admission from other high schools. For exam-
ple, Harvard would not be able to accept five or ten percent of the Phil-
lips Exeter Academy class and one percent or less of the class from other
high schools. Rather, the odds of admission to Harvard would have to be
the same from all high schools. Such an approach would preserve the
incentive to move to lower-performing school districts.
While the choice of a less competitive high school may seem like an
unfair way for families to “game” a top class rank policy, there is a more
accurate way to view the strategy. Top class rank policies allow universi-
ties to undo the existing gaming of the admissions process that has con-
tributed to the high level of economic inequality in the United States.
Current admissions policies reward the development of a two-tiered edu-
cation system, with “haves” and “have-nots,” rather than a system in
which all students can realize their potential. As a corollary, current ad-
mission policies reward parents who congregate in up-scale neighbor-
hoods and abandon the inner city or other locales for their residences,
taking their wealth to advantaged communities and exacerbating eco-
nomic inequality. In contrast, top class rank policies reward parents for
setting up their households in less advantaged communities and moving
society in a direction of greater social and economic equality.
In addition to creating an incentive for higher-income families to
move to lower-performing school districts, top class rank policies create
important incentives for students already living in lower-performing
school districts. While students at lower-performing schools face long
odds for admission to selective colleges under traditional college admis-
sions policies, top class rank policies give them much more favorable
odds. Hence, when elite universities switch to a top class rank policy,
they greatly increase the payoff for working hard at one’s studies.53 Ac-
cordingly, top class rank policies should result in higher academic
achievement generally among students at lower-performing schools. This
53 Kalena E. Cortes & Lei Zhang, The Incentive Effects of the Top 10% Plan 4 (June 14,
2012) (unpublished manuscript) (available online at http://users.nber.org/~cortesk/KCortes
%20LZhang%20Incentives-Top10.pdf).
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is exactly what has happened in Texas. Performance on the State’s stan-
dardized testing for tenth graders has increased in lower-performing
schools, especially at the lowest-performing schools.54
IV. TOP CLASS RANK POLICIES CAN BE DESIGNED TO MINIMIZE
TRADE-OFFS
A. Top Class Rank Policies Can Produce a Well-Rounded Student
Body
Universities might worry that by focusing only on class rank as a
metric of student achievement, much would be lost in terms of student
body diversity and the richness of campus life. In fact, top class rank
policies can accommodate those concerns. If admissions offices want to
consider athletic ability, musical talent, or other interests and exper-
iences, they can do that too. As mentioned above, having a high class
rank could represent a threshold requirement for admission, with other
factors deciding which among the top class rank students are admitted.
An elite college could initially narrow its applicant pool by excluding
anyone with a high school class rank below the top five or ten percent.
Then it could winnow the pool further by taking into account other as-
pects of an applicant’s talents, experiences, and background. As noted, it
would just be important to ensure that there be an equal chance of admis-
sion across different high schools for the top athletes, artists, or other
applicants who bring special talents, experiences, or backgrounds to the
table.55
It also would be important to keep a top class rank as a threshold
requirement when other metrics are used to evaluate applicants. If stu-
dents could overcome a lower class rank with strong athletic ability or
exceptional musical talent, then students could game a top class rank
system by transferring schools for senior year of high school.56 But wait-
ing to transfer until senior year will not be attractive as long as class rank
is critical. The students would bring their grades with them and therefore
54 Id. at 3.
55 Equal treatment across high schools would include the principle that admissions be
proportionate. Students at a high school with 1000 students should have twice the odds of
admission as a student at a high school with 500 students. This would prevent families from
gaming a top class rank policy by creating a lot of small high schools. In Texas, students are
not eligible for the top class rank policy unless their high school has at least 10 students in the
graduating class. Marta Tienda, Striving for Neutrality Lessons from Texas in the Aftermath of
Hopwood and Fisher, in THE FUTURE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: NEW PATHS TO HIGHER EDU-
CATION DIVERSITY AFTER FISHER V. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS 91, 92 (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed.,
2014).
56 The most outstanding athletes and musicians would not need to transfer to take advan-
tage of a policy that rewards the top athletes or artists. But very good athletes or artists who
fall just below the top level of athletes and artists at their current school could rise to the top at
other high schools.
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could easily fall short of the necessary GPA for a top class rank in their
new school.57 Parents will choose the less competitive school at the out-
set of their children’s high school education if they want to improve their
children’s chances of admission to a selective university.58
Top class rank as a threshold requirement with consideration of ad-
ditional factors may seem complicated, and other factors would add more
complexity. For example, it is simple to apply a top class rank policy to a
high school with a senior class of a thousand, but what about very small
high schools, where the senior class might have only ten students?
Top class rank policies are no more complicated than current admis-
sions policies at selective colleges. Once a university abandons a simple
reliance on a composite of high school grades and test scores and em-
ploys a holistic evaluation of candidates that includes a host of factors,
the process becomes quite complex. In addition, the complexities of top
class rank policies should not be exaggerated. With regard to the high
school class size question, for example, more than 85% of public high
school students graduate with a senior class of at least one hundred.59
Students at very small schools can be considered by pooling them
together.
B. Top Class Rank Policies Can Maintain Academic Excellence
Universities also might worry that high school class rank provides
an imperfect measure of academic ability. Finishing at the top of a low-
performing school may say less about the high-ranker than about the
competition from classmates. Standardized test scores, on the other hand,
provide a measure that is uniform across high schools and that gives
colleges a way to compare top students from different schools.
As it turns out, top class rank policies can be implemented without
compromising the academic strength of a university’s student body. An
analysis of the Texas top class rank policy compared the college grades
and likelihood of graduation among beneficiaries of the policy at the UT-
Austin with the grades and graduation rates of the students who were
displaced—the rejected applicants who would have been admitted in the
absence of the top class rank policy. The study found that the top-rank
admittees “consistently performed as well as or better than” the displaced
57 Texas high schools addresses the transfer issue by requiring a minimum duration of
attendance before a student can qualify for the top class rank automatic admission. Cullen et
al., supra note 41, at 34.
58 Students whose families move to a different city or state during high school would not
be disadvantaged. While they would bring their grades with them to their new high schools,
they would have had to decide in their previous locale whether to enroll in a higher-performing
or lower-performing high school.
59 NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., generated by David Orentlicher, using El SI Table
Generator (2016).
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students, even though the top-rank admittees arrived at UT with lower
SAT or ACT scores.60
This may seem surprising, but it is not. Test scores are based on a
single test administered on a single day while class rank reflects four
years of effort in courses that present similar challenges to those that
high school students will face in college.61 Studies have found that high
school grades are a better predictor than test scores of college achieve-
ment and that the combination of grades and test scores offers only a
small increase in predictive accuracy over grades alone.62 According to
one study based on nationwide data, using test scores in addition to high
school class rank increases the ability of admissions officers to correctly
predict college completion in only one to two out of every thousand
cases.63 In a study of graduation rates at public universities, test scores
added little or nothing to the highly significant predictive power of high
school GPA.64 Studies at individual colleges come to similar conclu-
sions. When the office of admissions at Johns Hopkins University looked
at data for its students, it found that high school GPA was the best pre-
dictor of first-year college GPA “by a wide margin” when compared to
SAT and SAT Subject Test scores. Indeed, consideration of SAT scores
60 Niu & Tienda, supra note 45, at 64–65. Of course, the displaced students did not
attend UT-Austin. To estimate their level of college achievement, the researchers compared
the top class rank admittees with a cohort of admitted non-top rank students who were similar
in high school performance to the students who were displaced by the top class rank policy.
Thus, the study’s results are conservative—the students who actually were displaced were
viewed as weaker applicants than the students who made up the “displaced” student cohort in
the study. Id. at 50–51, 54. To be sure, UT-Austin expanded its academic support services to
help top class rank students make the transition from a low-performing high school to a high-
performing college.
If top class rank policies are adopted widely, top class rank admittees should be even
stronger than in Texas. Recall that universal adoption of class rank policies would provide a
greater incentive than does the Texas policy for families to choose lower-performing schools.
As lower-performing schools became more desirable, they would be better funded and their
students more competitive. Accordingly, the performance of their top students should improve
significantly.
61 Richard C. Atkinson & Saul Geiser, Reflections on a Century of College Admissions
Tests, in SAT WARS: THE CASE FOR TEST-OPTIONAL COLLEGE ADMISSIONS 23, 25 (Joseph A.
Soares ed. 2012).
62 Id.; James Crouse, Does the SAT Help Colleges Make Better Selection Decisions?, 55
HARV. EDUC. REV. 195, 212 (1985); John Brittain & Benjamin Landy, Reducing Reliance on
Testing to Promote Diversity, in THE FUTURE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: NEW PATHS TO
HIGHER EDUCATION DIVERSITY AFTER FISHER V. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS 160, 160–61 (Richard
D. Kahlenberg ed. 2014); Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action:
Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL. L. REV. 953, 974–75 (1996). Analyses from the not-
for-profit that sponsors the SAT, the College Board, find somewhat better predictive value
from the SAT than is found in analyses by outsiders. Brittain & Landy, supra, at 161.
63 Crouse, supra note 62, at 209.
64 WILLIAM G. BOWEN, MATTHEW M. CHINGOS, & MICHAEL S. MCPHERSON, CROSSING
THE FINISH LINE: COMPLETING COLLEGE AT AMERICA’S PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES 113–16 (2009).
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in addition to high school GPA improved the office’s ability to predict
first-year achievement by only two percent.65
The small benefit from standardized test scores has been illustrated
in other ways. In a study of colleges that made submission of test scores
optional, there were only marginal and statistically insignificant differ-
ences in college achievement between students who submitted test scores
and students who opted not to submit their scores.66 Moreover, because
there is a much greater correlation between family wealth and test scores
than between family wealth and high school grades,67 consideration of
test scores does more to distinguish between higher- and lower-income
applicants than between stronger and weaker applicants.68 As a result, it
is becoming increasingly common for selective colleges, including Bow-
doin, Bryn Mawr, Smith, and Wesleyan, to make submission of SAT or
ACT scores optional for applicants.69
If colleges wanted to take test scores into account, they still could
do so under a top class rank policy. Admissions officers could make the
scores one of the additional factors used to winnow their applicant pools
after narrowing the pools based on class rank. By considering test scores
65 Teresa Wonnell, Chloe Melissa Rothstein, & John Latting, Predictors of Academic
Success at a Highly Selective Private Research University, in SAT WARS: THE CASE FOR
TEST-OPTIONAL COLLEGE ADMISSIONS 137, 141 (Joseph A. Soares ed., 2012). SAT Subject
Test scores added only one percent to the admissions offices ability to predict first-year
achievement. Id. at 143. This study was conducted after the 2005 revision of the SAT. Id. at
137. A study at Siena College of its students found that high school GPA was a “somewhat
stronger predictor” than SAT score of final college GPA and that there was a “sharp decline”
in college graduation rates for students with high SATs and low high school GPAs. SIENA
COLLEGE OFFICE OF INSTITUTIONAL RESEARCH, WHITE PAPER: SAT SCORES AS PREDICTORS OF
ACADEMIC SUCCESS (Aug. 29, 2013).
66 William C. Hiss & Valerie W. Franks, Defining Promise: Optional Standardized Test-
ing Policies in American College and University Admissions 8 (Feb. 2014), http://
www.nacacnet.org/research/research-data/nacac-research/Documents/DefiningPromise.pdf.
The average final GPAs for the two groups were 2.88 for submitters and 2.83 for non-submit-
ters, and the graduation rates were 64.5% and 63.9%, respectively. Id. at 8.
67 Brittain & Landy, supra note 58, at 166.
68 Id. at 160.
69 Id. at 165; Nick Anderson, George Washington University Applicants No Longer Need
to Take Admissions Tests, WASH. POST, July 27, 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
grade-point/wp/2015/07/27/george-washington-university-applicants-no-longer-need-to-take-
admissions-tests; FAIRTEST: NATIONAL CENTER FOR FAIR & OPEN TESTING, 180+ “TOP TIER”
SCHOOLS WHICH DEEMPHASIZE THE ACT/SAT IN ADMISSIONS DECISIONS PER U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT BEST COLLEGES GUIDE (2015), http://www.fairtest.org/sites/default/files/Op-
tional-Schools-in-U.S.News-Top-Tiers.pdf. At Bowdoin, one reason for making SAT scores
optional was the fact that among its honors graduates, only 31% had scored above the class
average for the exam while 24% had scored below the average. DAVID OWEN & MARILYN
DOERR, NONE OF THE ABOVE: THE TRUTH BEHIND THE SATS, REVISED AND UPDATED 238
(1999).
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in this fashion, very little would be lost. Test scores are least valuable
when used to compensate for an applicant’s low GPA.70
Other concerns about top class rank policies can be addressed in the
design of the policies. For example, because students might take easier
classes to ensure a higher GPA, high schools can give extra grade points
for more challenging classes, as is common already, and colleges can
make sufficiently demanding coursework a prerequisite to admission.71
Would great emphasis on class rank put undue pressure on high
school students who want to attend an elite university? These students
already face intense pressure, and they already recognize that they need
exceptional credentials to be successful candidates at colleges that accept
as few as five percent of applicants. According to 2007 data, the average
student at the most selective colleges enrolled with an SAT/ACT score at
the ninety-eighth percentile.72
C. Top Class Rank Policies Can Ensure Racial, Ethnic, and
Economic Diversity
If higher-income parents choose lower-performing schools for their
children, would that undermine the ability of top class rank policies to
admit applicants from underrepresented minorities or from economically
disadvantaged backgrounds? As mentioned, top class rank policies pro-
duce much of their racial, ethnic, and economic diversity by drawing
students from high schools that have high enrollments of minority and
low-income students.73
If top class rank policies drive upper-income, white families to the
minority high schools, those schools might send more upper-income,
white graduates and fewer lower-income, minority graduates to selective
institutions. As wealthier white students displaced poorer minority stu-
dents, the diversity benefits of top class rank policies would erode.
Top class rank policies need not be viewed simply as alternatives to
affirmative action. Universities can compensate for any displacement ef-
fects of top class rank policies by taking into account an applicant’s race
or ethnicity.
And even in the absence of an affirmative action policy, colleges
can maintain racial and ethnic diversity with top class rank policies by
reserving seats in their entering classes for applicants who have exper-
70 OWEN & DOERR, supra note 69, at 236 (quoting current and former admissions of-
ficers at Harvard, Stanford, and other universities for the point that applicants with low high
school grades and high SAT scores are very weak candidates).
71 Texas amended its top class rank policy to include a rigorous high school curriculum
requirement. Tienda, supra note 55, at 92 n.4.
72 Hoxby, Changing Selectivity, supra note 21, at 99.
73 See supra, text accompanying notes 28–34.
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ienced economic disadvantage, family hardship, or other obstacles.
While consideration of socioeconomic disadvantage usually is not as ef-
fective as direct consideration of race and ethnicity at promoting racial
and ethnic diversity,74 it is possible to fashion policies based on eco-
nomic class that are more effective than direct consideration of race or
ethnicity.75
Moreover, the displacement of minority and low-income students
would diminish over time. As school districts become less stratified in
terms of wealth, race, and ethnicity, poor and minority students will en-
joy greater opportunities to realize their potential. Recall in this regard
the earlier point that what matters more for economic mobility of chil-
dren is not the degree of economic inequality but the degree to which
neighborhoods are economically segregated.76
In sum, while there are potential disadvantages of top class rank
policies, the risks can be minimized by sound design. Adopting top class
rank policies poses little threat to higher education. On the other hand,
the potential payoff from the policies is very high. If top class rank poli-
cies make for greater economic equality among communities in the
United States, then the policies’ benefits would extend beyond the small
percentage of children who would achieve a top class rank—or the small
percentage who benefit currently from affirmative action policies77—to
all of the children in currently disadvantaged communities.
V. TOP CLASS RANK POLICIES AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
While the socioeconomic implications of top class rank policies
provide sufficient reason for elite universities to adopt them, the univer-
sities may be forced in upcoming years to consider top class rank policies
as alternatives to their current admissions policies.
74 Anthony P. Carnevale, Stephen J. Rose & Jeff Strohl, Achieving Racial and Economic
Diversity with Race-Blind Admissions Policy, in THE FUTURE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: NEW
PATHS TO HIGHER EDUCATION DIVERSITY AFTER FISHER V. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS 187, 191–93
(Richard D. Kahlenberg ed., 2014).
75 Matthew N. Gaertner, Advancing College Access with Class-Based Affirmative Ac-
tion: The Colorado Case, in THE FUTURE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: NEW PATHS TO HIGHER
EDUCATION DIVERSITY AFTER FISHER V. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS 175, 180–81 (Richard D.
Kahlenberg ed., 2014) (discussing a class-based policy developed at the University of
Colorado).
76 Supra, text accompanying notes 11–13. Note that top class rank policies have an in-
herently limited displacement effect. The more rapid the movement of upper-income families
to lower-performing school districts, the quicker the dissipation of the displacement effect. On
the other hand, the more gradual the movement of upper-income families, the less pronounced
will be the displacement effect.
77 Not only does affirmative action in higher education reach a small percentage of mi-
nority students, it also reaches only the more affluent in the minority student pool. Richard H.
Sander, Class in American Legal Education, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 631, 651 (2011).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\26-1\CJP103.txt unknown Seq: 20 30-NOV-16 10:36
120 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 26:101
The U.S. Supreme Court has increasingly expressed concerns about
the constitutionality of race-conscious admissions policies. When the
Court upheld the affirmative action policy at the University of Michigan
Law School in 2003, the justices announced their expectation that “25
years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be neces-
sary.”78 Many court watchers expected the Court to shorten that time
horizon earlier this year and reject race-conscious policies in Fisher v.
University of Texas.79
In Fisher, Abigail Fisher challenged UT-Austin’s use of affirmative
action as a complement to its top class rank approach after the University
denied Fisher a seat in its 2008 undergraduate entering class.80 While the
Court upheld the UT-Austin admissions policy, it emphasized the narrow
scope of its decision. The Court referred to the “sui generis” nature of
the policy and the fact that the biggest impact on the plaintiff’s chances
for admission came from the top class rank component of the admissions
policy rather than the affirmative action component.81 The Court also
warned that because “this case has been litigated on a somewhat artificial
basis,” its peculiar circumstances “may limit its value for prospective
guidance.”82
Because the Court has become less sympathetic to race-conscious
admissions policies, universities need to prepare for the possibility that
they will have to turn to alternative admissions policies.83 This is true for
private, as well as public, universities. While past challenges to affirma-
tive action have primarily raised Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
challenges, some of them also have raised a claim under Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which applies to public and private universities
78 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003).
79 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016); see, e.g., FANTASY SCOTUS, https://fantasyscotus.lexpredict.
com/case-prediction/fisher-v-univ-of-tx/ (last visited Aug. 14, 2016) (reporting that a majority
of participants in the Fantasy Scotus prediction survey expected the Court to reject the UT
policy rather than uphold it).
80 Fisher, 136 S. Ct. at 2207.
81 Id. at 2208–09.
82 Id. at 2209. The artificial basis reflected the facts that the case came to the Court with
important factual gaps in the record and that the passage of time made it infeasible to remand
the case for further fact-finding. Id.
83 Eight states have adopted bans on affirmative action in public universities, either
through legislative action, executive order, or public referenda. Halley Potter, What Can We
Learn from States that Ban Affirmative Action?, THE CENTURY FOUND. (June 26, 2014), https:/
/tcf.org/content/commentary/what-can-we-learn-from-states-that-ban-affirmative-action (last
visited Aug. 15, 2016). In these states, public universities already have had to turn to alterna-
tives to affirmative action. For some examples of states using top class rank approaches, see
supra note 25. In Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014),
the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of bans on affirmative action in higher
education.
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alike, and which applies the same standards that the Equal Protection
Clause applies.84
Under either the Fourteenth Amendment or Title VI, top class rank
policies should withstand scrutiny. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
stated that universities should employ race-neutral alternatives to pro-
mote student body diversity before turning to race-conscious policies.85
Top class rank policies meet the Court’s standard for a race-neutral pol-
icy.86 Moreover, as indicated above, the Texas top class rank policy has
done a better job than the affirmative action policy at UT-Austin of en-
rolling underrepresented minorities and economically disadvantaged
students.87
VI. TOP CLASS RANK POLICIES AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES TO
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Could selective universities promote economic equality through
other alternatives to affirmative action? Are some of the alternatives su-
perior to top class rank policies in terms of promoting not only economic
equality but also student body diversity? That does not seem likely.
Other policies would be less effective than top class rank policies.
For example, admissions policies often try to foster student body
diversity by taking into account an applicant’s socioeconomic disadvan-
tage. This approach can do much to generate a diverse entering class.
However, it preserves the current incentives that college admissions poli-
cies create for economic inequality—higher-income families would still
be better off in terms of their children’s college prospects by remaining
in their exclusive communities.
Universities also might consider an admissions policy based on geo-
graphic diversity. Under such an approach, elite colleges would give
84 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343. Title VI claims have been brought successfully against uni-
versities in the past. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287 (1978)
(holding that Title VI proscribes racial discrimination that would be proscribed by the Four-
teenth Amendment); Flanagan v. President & Dirs. of Georgetown Coll., 417 F. Supp. 377
(D.D.C. 1976) (finding race-based financial aid to violate Title VI under some circumstances).
85 See, e.g., Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2420 (writing that race-conscious admission policies are
permitted only when “no workable race-neutral alternatives would produce the educational
benefits of diversity”).
86 To be sure, there is some inconsistency between the Court’s characterization of race-
neutral admissions policies in higher education and its characterization of race-neutral policies
in other settings. Ordinarily, if a policy is written in race neutral terms and has a disparate
impact on the basis of race, the Court will treat the policy as race-conscious if there was intent
to have the disparate racial impact. Top class rank policies are adopted with intent to have a
disparate impact on the basis of race. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 303 n.10 (2003) (Gins-
burg, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, the Court has not subjected them to heightened scrutiny. Cf.
id. at 297 (Souter, J., dissenting) (observing that “there is nothing unconstitutional” about top
class rank policies).
87 See supra text accompanying notes 30–34.
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preference to applicants from underrepresented neighborhoods or simply
seek an entering class that includes the best applicants from a broad
range of communities. Southern Methodist University adopted the under-
represented neighborhood approach to geographic diversity after Hop-
wood,88 Danielle Allen has advocated for geographic diversity based on
a wide range of zip codes,89 and other scholars favor a combination of
geographic approaches.90
Like top class rank policies, geographic policies encourage higher-
income families to live in lower-income neighborhoods. But it is easier
for higher-income families to undermine the ability of geographic poli-
cies to counteract economic inequality or promote a diverse student
body. For example, parents can send their children to elite private high
schools rather than the public schools in their geographic area. They also
could move into the lower-income geographic area, or rent an apartment
there, just for their child’s senior year of high school.
VII. IMPLEMENTING TOP CLASS RANK POLICIES
To fully appreciate top class rank policies, it is important to recog-
nize what they do not entail. They do not require any tax increases or
expansion of public benefit programs—indeed, they reduce the demand
on programs for the poor. No one has to be forcibly bused to school.
Neither legislatures nor courts need act. In the past, implementation of
top class rank policies in Texas and other states has been driven by court
decisions, legislation, or public referenda, and the federal government
could require colleges to adopt top class rank policies by making their
adoption a condition for universities to receive federal funding. But lead-
ing universities need not wait for a government mandate. They can sim-
ply act on their own to implement top class rank admissions policies.
To be sure, elite universities would have to act collectively—indi-
vidual colleges would be reluctant to act alone for fear that they would
suffer in the US News or other rankings if their average SAT and ACT
scores declined relative to those at other colleges. But elite universities
already know how to act collectively. They use a common application
form,91 and they have used the same formula for calculating financial
88 Orentlicher, supra note 28, at 201–02.
89 Danielle Allen, Talent Is Everywhere Using ZIP Codes and Merit to Enhance Diver-
sity, in THE FUTURE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: NEW PATHS TO HIGHER EDUCATION DIVERSITY
AFTER FISHER V. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS 145, 147–48 (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed. 2014).
90 CASHIN, supra note 5, at 82–83.
91 Jessica Gross, Who Made That? (College Application), N.Y. TIMES, November 10,
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/10/magazine/who-made-that-college-application.html.
To be sure, many colleges request supplemental application materials.
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aid.92 By acting together on class rank policies, selective universities can
make it possible for the United States to live up to its vision as a land of
opportunity for all.93
CONCLUSION
Elite universities are not mere bystanders to the problem of eco-
nomic inequality. They do much to reward and reinforce the residential
segregation by income of America that contributes to economic inequal-
ity. As a result, selective universities have a moral responsibility to pro-
mote economic equality, especially when they can do so at little cost.
And especially when they can do so without having to coerce anyone.
Top class rank policies promote socioeconomic equality by harnessing
the self-interested behavior of higher-income families. Or, to put it an-
other way, top class rank policies truly allow the wealthy to do good for
society by doing well for themselves.
92 United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 662–63 (3d Cir. 1993). The federal govern-
ment also has established financial aid guidelines for federal loans or loan guarantees. Id. at
662.
93 There might be some antitrust concern with common action, but it likely would sur-
vive a legal challenge on antitrust grounds. The most important precedent here is the litigation
over agreements by Ivy League and other leading schools to share financial aid information
and offer the same level of aid to each student (i.e., although different students might receive
different levels of aid, no student could obtain more aid from one of the schools than from the
other schools). Many of the schools signed a consent decree with the Justice Department, but
MIT went to court, and the Third Circuit’s decision in the case suggests that courts would be
sympathetic to a common admissions policy modeled upon the Texas top class rank approach.
See Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 678 (observing that universities may be given more freedom under
the Sherman Act if their concerted action broadens accessibility to higher education because
“[i]t is most desirable that schools achieve equality of educational access and opportunity in
order that more people enjoy the benefits of a worthy higher education”). In addition, the
consent decree only prohibited common action on decisions about financial aid, tuition and
fees, and faculty salary levels. See United States v. Brown Univ., 805 F. Supp. 288 (E.D. Pa.
1991). Since antitrust law is more concerned about price-fixing than with other kinds of con-
certed action, agreements about financial aid, tuition, and faculty salaries are going to be more
difficult to sustain than agreements about admissions criteria. And if antitrust concerns are
serious, the colleges could seek an exemption from Congress.
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